Directive 2004/54/EC [1] on minimum safety requirements for tunnels in the trans-European road network sets the bases for establishing an acceptable safety level for tunnel users across EU member states. Furthermore, many EU member states enforce stricter safety requirements for tunnels in their territory. The lack of a methodology for determining design and operating requirements for tunnels leads many times to an expensive over-design for tunnel works and thereafter operation and maintenance, throughout the tunnel lifetime without the expected increase in safety levels. In the present paper a methodology has been developed in order to assist all parties involved in contracting tunnel works to establish the optimum design and operating requirements. The methodology combines results of risk analysis with cost benefit analysis in different time periods throughout the tunnel design life. The results from implementing the aforementioned methodology include the optimum set of design and operating requirements for each tunnel under consideration. Concluding, the necessary contribution of each beneficiary to the funding of the different sets of design and operating requirements for certain time periods throughout tunnel lifetime, is soundly estimated and justified. The proposed methodology is an excellent tool since it can be used regardless of specific risk acceptance criteria.
Introduction
In the trans-European road network, the minimum safety requirements for road tunnels are imposed by Directive 2004/54/EC [1] . By this it is established a uniform minimum safety level for road tunnel users throughout European Union.
Furthermore, since different societies have different tolerance to risk depending on a number of parameters, member states have established additional requirements to enhance road tunnel safety levels in their road networks. These requirements involve both design and operating specifications that are applicable to all tunnels depending mainly on their length. Since there are no two identical tubes even of the same tunnel-having at least opposite slopes-each tunnel and furthermore each tube should be considered unique. Therefore, it is very important to determine the design and operating requirements for each tunnel in particular and not under general guidelines. The safety level and risk acceptance criteria should be uniform for all tunnels, but the safety level for each tunnel can be achieved only by a particular set of design and operating requirements including structural elements, equipment specifications and operational standards.
Minimum safety levels are established by the proper combination of tunnel design and operation procedures. Minimum safety levels refer mostly to road accidents that can result in numerous fatalities, mainly due to domino effects of the accident outcome involving a fire or release of hazardous material. Although road accident frequencies with one or two fatalities are disproportionally larger to road accident frequencies with multiple fatalities, societies are risk averse and do not tolerate multiple fatality accidents. The tunnel environment is a confined space where consequences of fire or hazardous material releases are more severe than in the open road. A road accident with a subsequent fire in the open road will have a damage potential limited to the vehicles involved, while in a tunnel environment the subsequent fire may produce enough smoke with a damage potential to the rest of the tunnel users not involved in the accident. The same undesirable consequences resulting from toxic material releases and explosions are more probable inside a tunnel than in the open road. Therefore, specific measures should be envisaged to reduce the frequency of such accidents and mitigate their consequences. Such measures involve emergency exits between tunnel tubes to provide shorter escape routes for tunnel users compared to escaping from the tunnel portals. The necessary distance between the emergency exits depends on the available time that tunnel users have before the smoke propagates over them causing suffocation. This time involves realization and reaction time along with the necessary time to reach the emergency exit, which determines the maximum allowable interval between emergency exits. Since realization and reaction time can be decreased by efficient accident detection and public-address systems, emergency exit intervals can be increased accordingly.
Therefore, an optimum set of design and operation requirements can be established (Table 1 [7] is conducted with the goal of minimizing the total cost that equals the sum of the cost of each combination of additional safety measures and the cost of the residual risk of the aforementioned combination of safety measures. In case where the minimum total cost estimated through cost benefit analysis is less than the initial cost of the residual risk based on minimum safety requirements, then the specific combination of additional safety measures is adopted and the distribution of cost for financing them is performed between the society (government funding) and tunnel users (tolls).
The proposed methodology provides decision makers a dynamic supporting tool for the funding resources of the additional to the minimum required safety measures. By introducing dynamic parameters of estimating the costs of additional safety measures and residual risk, the need of setting threshold limits and risk acceptance criteria can be questioned. Since, the different parameters that determine the total cost changes over time, the proposed methodology should be applied in regular intervals set by the decision maker.
Methodology-Results
The proposed methodology involves the consideration of all possible additional measures on the minimum requirements for the increase of safety levels [8] .
This can be accomplished either by measures decreasing accident frequency or by measures mitigating the consequences of accidents or combination of them.
The risk reduction measures are initially divided to structural, which concern the structure and the equipment of the tunnel and operational [9] , which concern the action plans and operating procedures. Then, the safety measures can vehicles per lane, the construction of a second, unidirectional twin tube should be considered, in order the tunnel to be functional when the previous value is exceeded [11] . Generally, the road tunnel should be made in harmony with the category of the road in which is going to be constructed. The geometry of the tunnel is related to the width of traffic lanes, the existence of emergency lane and free traffic space. The previously mentioned geometrical specifications affect extensively the safety of the tunnel. In addition, the lighting of the tunnel must ensure that vehicles should be able to approach, pass through and leave the tunnel during daytime and nighttime, having a speed, safety and comfort levels similar to those in the consecutive open road network" [12] . The main problem of the lighting of the tunnel is the configuration of sufficient lighting in the entrance zone. An excessive level of lighting it is a waste of financial resources in terms of installation and maintenance cost. Finally, the existence of lay-bys is best practice, in case a car breaks down inside the tunnel. In that way, accidents that are caused by immobilized vehicle in a traffic lane, can be prevented.
The operational measures which reduce accident frequency include the way that works are executed inside the tunnel, the policy of the dangerous goods transportation, the forbiddance or not of overtaking inside the tunnel, safety distances and speed limits. During maintenance works in a unidirectional tube of a road tunnel, the lane which is nearest to the work spot must be closed. That way, personnel is more secure than using only the tunnel emergency walkways [13] . Transportation of dangerous good through road tunnels should be considered by conducting a risk analysis study with a sound and official methodology.
Also, ADR agreement should be taken into consideration and the tunnel should be categorized accordingly to one or more of ADR categories for the different time periods. Special operational measures for risk reduction can be taken, based on the results of the risk analysis study. These measures may concern a part or the whole number of vehicles carrying dangerous goods. In addition, the num- cost benefit analysis compares the total cost with the total benefits for every possible set of measures and concludes to the optimum set of safety measures. Therefore, at the second stage of the proposed methodology, a cost benefit analysis is conducted, and the optimum set of design and operating requirements are specified.
The results of the present work include the mathematical modeling of the proposed methodology. In the first stage a risk analysis is conducted to estimate residual risk (including the expected value EV) for every possible set of design and operating parameters. In the second stage the cost benefit analysis is conducted, and the optimum set of design and operating requirements is specified.
The methodology for conducting a tunnel risk analysis is given by each member state and includes also considerations for the transportation of dangerous goods
The process of cost benefit analysis includes the estimation of net present value of the total investment in safety measures and the benefits from the reduced residual risk. According to the cost benefit analysis methodology, the expected life cycle cost C t for the safety of an activity is equal to the sum of the total cost of safety measures C sm and the total cost of residual risk C rr . Figure 1 presented the calculation of the expected life cycle cost C t as the sum of the total cost of safety measures C sm and the total cost of residual risk C rr versus residual risk. The curve is an approximation of all relevant data acquired through a detailed financial analysis that was based on the structural and operational measures described above, for a specific unidirectional road tunnel.
It is observed that the total cost of safety measures is increased with a decrease in the residual risk, while the cost of residual risk is increased with an increase in the residual risk, as should be expected. The point where the sum of the two aforementioned cost gets its minimum value defines the optimum set of design and operating requirements. 
The total cost of safety measures C sm is equal to the sum of each proposed k safety measure C smk which depends on the initial cost of installation C smki , the maintenance cost C smkm , the operation cost C smko and the salvage value C smks and is calculated by the following equation.
The total cost of residual risk C rr is equal to the sum of the human impact cost C hi , the cleaning and rehabilitation of accident scene cost C cr , the evacuation of the nearby population cost C ev , the public property damage cost C pd , the business interruption cost C bi , the freight loss and vehicle damage cost C ld and the cost of traffic delay C td . The reduction of residual risk cost DC rr (= DC tu + DC sc ) is divided into two parts. The first part contains all costs DC tu associated with the tunnel users (C ld , C td ), while the second part contains all cost DC sc associated with the society (C hi , C cr , C ev , C pd , C bi ).
DOI
The beneficiary of cost reduction DC tu is tunnel users, while the beneficiary of the cost reduction DC sc is the society. Therefore, the contribution for tunnel users (tolls) and society (public financing) in the funding of the additional safety measures on the minimum requirements is C tu and C sc respectively and are calculated as follows.
It should be mentioned that all costs in the proposed methodology refers to net present values (NPV) of the specified time period (t) and are calculated by the following equation. 
where inf is the inflation and C 1 , C 2 , C t are the cash flows in the first, second and t th year respectively.
Discussion
The results of the present work include a methodology for determining addi- Finally, the proposed methodology does not include any specific threshold for risk acceptance criteria. This is a dynamic procedure since additional safety measures are justified mainly through a cost benefit analysis. 
